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Abstract 
We present a semantics for adding uncertainty to 
conditional logics for default reasoning and be­
lief revision. We are able to treat conditional sen­
tences as statements of conditional probability, 
and express rules for revision such as "If A were 
believed, then B would be believed to degree 
p." This method of revision extends conditional­
ization by allowing meaningful revision by sen­
tences whose probability is zero. This is achieved 
through the use of counterfactual probabilities. 
Thus, our system accounts for the best properties 
of qualitative methods of update (in particular, the 
AGM theory of revision) and probabilistic meth­
ods. We also show how our system can be viewed 
as a unification of probability theory and possi­
bility theory, highlighting their orthogonality and 
providing a means for expressing the probability 
of a possibility. We also demonstrate the connec­
tion to Lewis's method of imaging. 
1 Introduction 
Recently, a number of (more or less equivalent) conditional 
theories for default reasoning and belief revision have been 
proposed (Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor 1990; Goldszmidt 
and Pearl 1991; Boutilier 1990, 1992a, 1993a, 1993b). The 
cornerstone of such conditional logics is a conditional con­
nective=?. The sentence A => B can be interpreted as a 
default rule of the form "If A then normally B." A =? B 
may also be interpreted as a subjunctive conditional of the 
form "If an agent were to believe A then it would believe 
B." According to the Ramsey test such a conditional is true 
iff the agent comes to accept B when it revises its beliefs to 
incorporate a new sentence A (Stalnaker 1968). Thus, any 
conditional logic can be thought of as determining a theory 
of belief revision. 
Unfortunately, such conditionals cannot be used to represent 
uncertainty in the revision process. In this paper, we present 
a system in which one can express conditionals of this form, 
but attach to the consequent of the conditional a degree of 
belief to capture the uncertainty inherent in the conclusion. 
Thus, we will be able to capture statements of the form 
"If an agent believed A, it would believe B to degree p." 
The notion of revision determined by such statements will 
extend the usual process of conditionalization through the 
use of counterfactual probabilities. 
1.1 Conditional Logic and Degrees of Belief 
The logics cited above, should we take=? to be a subjunctive 
interpreted according to the Ramsey test, all correspond to 
the well-knownAGM theory of belief revision (Alchourron, 
Gllrdenfors and Makinson 1985; Gllrdenfors 1988). In fact, 
it has been shown that default rules of the above form can 
be interpreted as subjunctive conditionals (Boutilier 1992c, 
1993b; Makinson and Gl\rdenfors 1990). One need only 
view default rules as subjunctive conditionals that express 
constraints on bow an agent revises a theory of expecta­
tions. In what follows, we usually take A ::} B to be a 
subjunctive conditional, assuming that such a conditional 
may be interpreted as a default rule with no difficulty. 
A feature of conditional logics that has lead to their success 
in the representation of defeasible inference is the fact that 
conditionals can be used to express default rules and sub­
junctives in a very natural way and can be used to derive 
new rules. In particular, it is consistent to assert together 
the conditionals A ::} C and A 11 B =? ..,c, demonstrat­
ing the defeasibility inherent in conditional reasoning. This 
fact can be exploited in the representation of uncertain or 
context-dependent inference: in context A, C is a reason­
able conclusion; but if B is known as well, C is no longer 
acceptable. For example, in certain approaches to model­
based diagnosis, preference is given to diagnoses requiring 
as few faulty components as possible. So a conditional 
default rule might suggest that, given observation Ot, com­
ponent Ct alone is faulty. Given an additional observation 
02 however, C 1 might fail to be a diagnosis. 
As mentioned above, a difficulty with the conditional ap­
proach to defauJt inference and belief revision is its cate­
gorical nature. One can represent the fact that Cis (fully) 
believed or that it is not; but no other distinctions can be 
made, for example, with respect to degree of belief. If 
neither C nor ..,c is fully believed, both are "serious pos­
sibilities," but neither can be preferred to the other; so, for 
example, an agent cannot decide whether to act on the ba-
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sis of C or -,c. Similar remarks apply to conditionals: if 
an agent accepts both -,(A => C) and -,(A => -,C) then, 
should the agent adopt A, the relative likelihood of C and 
-,c cannot be represented. In our informal example, we 
might have a default that exactly one of components C1, C2 
or C3 is faulty given 01• Thus, in context 01. all multiple 
faults (and single faults involving other components) are 
rejected as serious possibilities. This reduces the space of 
candidate diagnoses, but does not allow one to distinguish 
the remaining candidates. Typically, we want to investigate 
alternatives according to their likelihood (de Kleer 1991; 
Poole 1993). If failure of C1 is more likely than that of C2 
or c3 'testing strategies (say) might be altered. 
Probabilistic representations can be used to circumvent this 
difficulty. One can assign probabilities to each possibility 
admitted by a belief set or knowledge base KB. We think of 
such probabilities as degrees of belief. A serious possibility 
relative to any belief set is any sentence A such that P (A) > 
0. A (full) belief is any sentence A such that P(A) = 1. 
With respect to a given KB, the conditional A => C means 
that revising KB to accommodate A results in a belief in C. 
Assuming that we have a probability function P assigning 
degrees of belief to the possibilities admitted by KB, it is 
natural to assume that revising KB by A is identical to con­
ditionalization of P by A; thus, asserting A => C amounts 
to stating that P(CIA) = 1. Furthermore, it provides a 
natural means of specifying "uncertain" conditionals: if 
P(CIA) = p then we might say that a conditional A=> C 
Jwlds to degree p (if an agent came to believe A it would 
believe C to degree p ). Unfortunately, there is a crucial dif­
ficulty with such an approach. If P(A) = 0, then P(CIA) 
is undefined or given some trivial value for all C. In con­
trast, conditionals A => C are meaningful in the case where 
-,A E KB. Theories of revision provide nontrivial results, 
new beliefs, possibilities and impossibilities, even when 
the new information A is inconsistent with KB (indeed, this 
is the principle case for belief revision). For instance, in 
model-based diagnosis, typically one only looks for a diag­
nosis when observation 0 is inconsistentwithKB (typically 
a system description together with normality assumptions). 
Conditioning on 0 is then meaningless. 
In order to augment arbitrary conditionals with degrees of 
belief we need some generalization of conditional proba­
bility, whereby it is meaningful to assert P( CIA) = p (for 
some non-extreme value p) when P(A) = 0. In this paper 
we present a semantics for just such a system. We use the 
notion of counterfactual probability as described by Stal­
naker (1970) and Lewis (1976). Our system can be viewed 
as a refinement and a semantic model for counterfactual 
probabilities. We demonstrate the relationship to existing 
conditional logics for default reasoning and belief revision. 
In particular, we show that our logic (conservatively) ex­
tends and unifies two predominant views of belief updating: 
probabilistic conditionalization and the AGM theory of re­
vision. We also describe our system in terms of possibilistic 
logic (Dubois and Prade 1988). As pointed out in (Boutilier 
1992b), possibilistic logic cannot be used to represent un­
certainty or degrees of belief. Rather it should be viewed as 
a representation mechanism for the entrenchment of certain 
beliefs (see Section 2); thus it provides a means for updat­
ing by counterfactual sentences. In this sense, our logic is a 
unification of probability theory and possibility theory that 
highlights their orthogonality and adds to possibility theory 
the means to express the probability of a possibility. 
1.2 Why Use Categorical Rules? 
If one is going to use probabilities as degrees of belief, it 
seems natural to question the need for (categorical) default 
rules, conditionals or counterfactual probabilities. If one is 
going to allow a sentence A in KB to be retracted when ..,A 
is learned, why not simply assign A some degree of belief 
less than 1 in the first place and use standard techniques such 
as conditionalization to incorporate new items of belief? 
If one wishes to allow the possibility that any "belief' can 
be overturned given the proper evidence, then full belief 
can be granted only to tautologies, and every contingency 
must have some probability. To take a slightly less extreme 
view, one might accord observational reports (say) the sta­
tus of full belief, but still no conclusions drawn from these 
would be certain. Presumably, there are certain computa­
tional advantages to be gained by ruling out possibilities that 
are very unlikely (Cheeseman 1985; Harman 1986). Chief 
among these is the ability to exploit logical rules of infer­
ence. Such rules allow conclusions to be reached in manner 
that is independent of context, in contrast to probabilistic 
inference. The locality of logical rules can be exploited 
if parts of the knowledge base (are assumed to) have full 
belief (Pearl 1988). 
It may also be that the cost associated with reaching incor­
rect (unhedged) conclusions and being forced to revise the 
belief set is outweighed by the probability of being correct. 
We might therefore think of a default rule as an instantia­
tion of an acceptance rule (Kyburg 1961). If A => B is a 
conditional held by the agent, we take it to mean that there 
is a certain utility associated with complete acceptance of 
B given A. 1 On this view, it is reasonable to allow a con­
ditional A => B to be held even when ..,A is accorded 
full belief, P( -,A) = 1. Consequently, we do not take a 
P(A) = 0 to indicate that A is (logically or physically) 
impossible, but simply that is is not, to use Levi's (1980) 
terminology, a serious possibility. 
1.3 Overview 
In Section 2 we review the possible worlds semantics for 
epistemic states, conditional logics and belief revision, 
showing its strong relation to possibility theory. In Sec­
tion 3 we add probabilities to this system in such a way 
that the conditional probability P( B lA) is meaningful even 
when P(A) = 0. We show that our method of belief re­
vision extends the AGM theory so that degrees of belief 
can be represented in revised belief sets, and that revision 
is identical to conditionalization if the update A is a serious 
possibility (i.e., if P(A) > 0). We also demonstrate how 
1 We do not address here the issue of how one determines 
appropriate acceptance rules; but in general decision-theoretic 
criteria should be brought to bear. 
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one may "index" degrees of possibility so that correct infer­
ences can be simulated without resorting to explicit counter­
factual probabilities (thus, standard probabilistic reasoning 
techniques can be applied to this reasoning process). In 
Section 4 we illustrate the relationship of our system to the 
method of imaging proposed by Lewis (1976). In particu­
lar, we show that our revision method fits the pattern of both 
generalized imaging and conditionalization. This stands in 
contrast to a widely-held view that conditionalization and 
generalized imaging are irreconcilable (Gardenfors 1988). 
We conclude with a discussion of updated counterfactual 
probabilities and iterated revision. 
2 Belief Revision and Possibilistic Logic 
To keep the presentation simple, we assume a propositional 
language LcPL generated by a finite set of atomic variables 
P. The set of classical valuations for this language is 
denoted V, elements of V usually referred to as worlds. 
We take an agent to possess a deductively closed set of 
beliefs K (typically the closure of some finite knowledge 
base KB). The usual semantics for belief models the agent's 
belief state as a set of epistemically possible worlds, those 
worlds that make each belief in K true. Using the modal 
connective 8 for belief, an epistemic state (set of worlds) 
W satisfies BA just when A is true at each world in W.2 
We introduce several definitions. The set of A-worlds is 
denoted I lA II = { w E V : w F= A}. For a set of formulae 
K, the set of K-worlds IIKII is simply the set of worlds 
satisfying each element of K. 
2.1 Belief Revision 
This model of epistemic states is reasonable as long as an 
agent's beliefs never strain the credibility of K. However, 
should an agent learn some sentence A such that -,A E K, 
some revision of the agent's belief set and epistemic state 
is required. One of the best known theories of revision 
of this type is the AGM theory (Alchourr6n, Gardenfors 
and Makinson 1985; Gardenfors 1988). In its most widely 
cited form, the theory is presented as a set of postulates 
constraining logically acceptable revision functions. If K 
is some belief set, KA. denotes the belief set resulting from 
the revision of K to include A. One of the hallmarks of the 
AGM theory is its commitment to the principle of minimal 
change: one should give up as few beliefs as possible in 
K when attempting to accommodate A. The postulates 
impose certain logical constraints on this notion. A key 
and characteristic property of AGM revision operators is 
that K � KA. whenever -,A fl. K: if no beliefs have to 
be given up in order to accept A, then none should be. We 
call any revision function * that satisfies the postulates and 
AGM revision operator. 
In (Boutilier 1992a, 1993b) we present a possible worlds 
semantics and modal logic for the representation of AGM 
2 A somewhat more involved notion of satisfaction is required 
to capture iterated belief sentences, but this will suffice for our 
informal presentation. 
revision functions. A CO-model consists of a set of worlds 
W � V and an ordering relation � on W reflecting the de­
gree of plausibility attributed to various worlds by an agent. 
We interpret w � v as "w is at least as plausible as v." We 
insist that� be a total preorder on W (that is, a transitive, 
connected binary relation- see below). Intuitively, the 
most plausible worlds in W are those consistent with the 
agent's beliefs. All other worlds are epistemically impossi­
ble, but some are more plausible than others. A CO-model 
is a K -revision model just in case the set of most plausible 
worlds, those minimal in�. is exactly IIKII· It is just these 
models that can be reasonably used to represent and belief 
set K and its revision. 
Should an agent learn some information that contradicts its 
beliefs, II K II can no longer be held as a reasonable epis­
temic state. If -,A E K and A is learned, the agent must 
adopt a new belief set KA. of which A is a member. Seman­
tically, we simply require that the agent's new epistemic 
state be represented by the set of most plausible A-worlds, 
those minimal in �. Should B be true at each such world 
we say that B E KA.. According to the Ramsey test, this 
captures the acceptance conditions for a subjunctive condi­
tional A => B: if the agent believed A, it would believe B. 
In (Boutilier 1992a, 1993b) we provide a strong represen­
tation theorem relating this model to the AGM theory. We 
provide further technical details below. 
2.2 Possibilistic Logic 
In (Boutilier 1992b) we show how the modal logic CO can 
be used to capture qualitative possibilistic logic. We review 
this connection here, and formalize the model of revision 
discussed above in possibilistic terms. 
Possibilistic logic has been developed to a great extent by 
Dubois and Prade (see their (1988) for a survey). A possi­
bility measure II maps the sentences of LcPL into the real 
interval [0, 1]. The value II( a) is intended to represent the 
degree of possibility of a. We take this to represent the 
amount of surprise associated with adopting a as an epis­
temic possibility. If II( a) = 1 there is no surprise (i.e., a 
is consistent with the agent's beliefs), while II( a) = 0 in­
dicates that surprise is maximal (i.e., an agent would never 
adopt a). A possibility measure must satisfy the following 
three properties: 
(a) II(T) = 1 
(b) II(l.) = 0 
(c) II(A VB) = max(II(A), II( B)) 
A necessity measure N is a similar mapping, associating 
with a a degree of necessity. We take N (a) to represent 
the amount of surprise associated with giving up belief in 
a (or the degree of entrenchment of a in a belief set; see 
(Boutilier 1992b)). One may define necessity measures 
using the identity 
N(a) = 1- II(--,a). 
Semantically, we can model possibility measures using pos­














Figure 1: A Possibility Model 
in V a degree of possibility from the interval [0, 1]. This 
can be viewed as a ranking of worlds, with w being at least 
as possible as v just when 1r( w) � 1r( v ). This corresponds 
precisely to the relation w � v in a CO-model. 
Definition 1 A possibility model is a triple M = (V, W, 1r} 
where 
(a) V is the set of worlds suitable for LcPL; 
(b) 1r maps V into [0, 1]; and 
(c) W ={wE V: 1r(w) > 0}. 
Figure 1 illustrates a possibility model. W is the set of 
possible worlds, those assigned a non-zero degree of pos­
sibility. Epistemically possible worlds are those assigned 
possibility 1. We can also define truth conditions for a belief 
operator B and a subjunctive conditional ::} . 
Definition 2 Let M be a possibility model. 
(a) World w is epistemically possible iff 1r( w) = 1. 
(b) M induces the belief set K, where K is character­
ized by IIKII ={wE W: 1r(w) = 1}. 
(c) M F= BA iff A E K 
(iff {wE W :  1r(w) = 1} � IIAII). 
(d) The set of plausible (or most possible) A-worlds 
is denoted Pl(A), where w E Pl(A) iff w I== A and 
1r(w) � 1r(v) for all vI= A. 
(e) M F= A ::} B iff Pl(A) � IIBII· 
(t) K.A = {B : MFA::} B}. 
The model in Figure 1 captures the belief set K = 
Cn( {-,A, B} ). The conditional A ::} B is true, while nei­
ther A ::} C nor A ::} -,C hold. This is because B holds 
at all of the most plausible A-worlds (those with possibility 
.6), while C and -,c do not. We can show that the class of 
revision function * induced by possibility models is exactly 
the class of AGM revision functions.3 
3Technically, we require that the possibility model be "com­
plete" in the sense that V = W, that is, all worlds are possible. 
Theorem 1 (Boutilier 1992b) For any possibility model 
M, the induced revision function* satisfies the AGM pos­
tulates. For any AGM revision operator* and belief set K, 
there is a possibility model M that induces *· 
A distribution determines a possibility measure II as fol­
lows: 
II(A) = max{1r(w): w I= A}. 
In other words, the degree of possibility of A is just that 
of the most possible A-worlds (i.e., those worlds in Pl(A)). 
The model in Figure 1 admits -,A, B, C and ...,cas serious 
possibilities (e.g., II( C) = 1), while A and -,B are not 
(II(A) = .6 and II( -,B) = .4). Notice that -,B A ...,c is 
impossible: II( -,B /1. -,C) = 0. Assuming that 1r( w) = 1 
for some wE V,4 II determines a consistent belief set K. 
Furthermore, we have the following obvious relationships: 
(a) A E K iff N(A) > 0 iff II(-.A) < 1. Such a 
sentence is said to be accepted. If -,A E K, A is 
said to be rejected. 
(b) A f/:. K iff II( -,A) = 1. If neither of A or -,A is 
in K, A is said to be indeterminate. 
(c) M I= A ::} B iff II( A /1. B) > IT( A /1. -,B) or 
II(A) = 0. 
We note that possibility rankings can be given a probabilis­
tic interpretation using c:-semantics (Adams 1975; Pearl 
1988). We can associate ��:-rankings (Goldszmidt and Pearl 
1991) with degrees of possibility and take 7r( w) > 7r( v) to 
mean that world w is arbitrarily more probable than v. In 
this manner, we can ensure that the conditional probabil­
ity P(BIA) can be made arbitrarily high if A ::} B holds 
(Adams 1975). 
3 Counterfactual Probabilities 
The notion of epistemic state introduced in the last section 
has certain drawbacks. In particular, the serious possibili­
ties held by an agent cannot be distinguished according to 
their degree of certainty or belief. The epistemic status of 
a proposition A is one of acceptance, rejection or indeter­
minacy. Indeterminate propositions reflect an uncertainty 
about their truth, but among indeterminate propositions, no 
distinctions can be made with respect to degree of uncer­
tainty. Notice that possibility theory has nothing to offer 
in this regard: if neither A nor -,A are believed then both 
have degree of possibility 1 and degree of necessity 0. 
3.1 Semantics 
One would like to be able to express, for a given belief set 
K, the degree of belief associated with uncertain possibil­
ities. While neither of A or -,A may be sufficiently likely 
to warrant full acceptance, evidence may render one more 
If we drop that restriction, a simple modification of the AGM 
postulates will suffice. 
4Throughout, we will assume that W � V is nonempty. These 
proper possibility models will correspond to nonempty (consis­
tent) epistemic states. 
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probable than the other. We would like to say, for example, 
that an agent associates probability . 75 with A (or that A 
is believed to degree .75). Semantically, this is easily ac­
complished. In the usual fashion, we can assign a non-zero 
probability weight to each epistemically possible world, 
taking epistemically impossible worlds (1r( w) < 1) to have 
probability 0. In this manner, all full beliefs (accepted 
sentences) have probability 1 arid only serious possibilities 
have non-zero probability. 
While this provides degrees of belief for epistemic possibil­
ities, it does nothing to determine counterfactual probabili­
ties (e.g., P(BIA) where II(A) < 1). While the possibility 
distribution 1r distinguishes worlds according to their de­
gree of possibility, worlds within each possibility rank are 
indistinguishable. However, we can apply the same idea 
and assign, within each possibility rank, relative weights 
to worlds. Of course, we need not use a different weight 
assignment function for each value in the range of 1r. We 
can simply assign weight to all worlds and compare only 
the weights of worlds with the same degree of possibility. 
Definition 3 A counterfactual probability model (CPM) 
has the form M = (V, W, P, 1r) where 
(a) (V, W, 1r) is a possibility model; and 
(b) P maps W into (0, 1] 
As before, 1r( w) is the degree of possibility assigned to 
world w E V and W is the subset of "possible" worlds 
in V. P( w) is the probability weight assigned to possible 
world w. This weight must be non-negative, for we assume 
that only impossible worlds (V - W) can have no weight. 
The definition of the categorical belief set I< and the truth 
conditions for the conditional connective => are exactly as 
for a possibility model (Definition 2). The definition of a 
revised belief set I< .A also remains unchanged. 
As stated earlier, an agent's epistemic state is captured by 
those worlds w such that 1r( w) = 1. Furthermore, should an 
agent come to accept A, its revised belief state is captured 
by the set of most possible A-worlds Pl(A). Given this 
belief state, the degree of belief accorded some sentence B 
ought to be the relative weight of all B-worlds in this set. 
This leads to the following definitions. 
Definition 4 Let M = (V, W, P, 1r) be a CPM. The coun­
terfactual probability of B given A (w.r.t. M) is 
i A) l:{P(w): wE Pl(A) and w p B} P(B = l:{P(w): wE Pl(A)} 
Since P is defined only on worlds in W, this term is unde­
fined iff A is impossible (i.e., if 1r(A) = 0). 
Definition 5 The factual probability of A ( w.r.t. M) is 
P(A) = P(A i T) 
Proposition 2 For any CPM M, the factual probability 
function P is a probability function. 
We take the unconditional, factual probability function P 
to define the objective epistemic state of the agent. This is 
the usual notion of degree of belief, where only epistemic 
or serious possibilities have non-zero probability. 
Proposition 3 P(A) = 1 iff A E I<. 
We define factual conditional probability in the usual way: 
Definition 6 P(BIA) = P�(�)) for all A such that 
P(A) > 0. 
Our goal is now to describe a method for an agent to move 
from one epistemic state to another during the course of 
revision. In particular, we must describe the new factual 
probability function P.A that results when the agent's orig­
inal epistemic state P is revised by A. This revision will 
proceed by means of counterfactual conditionalization. 
Definition 7 Let P be the factual probability function de-
termined by M. The revised factual probability func­
tion P.A is given by 
Pl(B) = P(B j A) 
The (objective) epistemic state of an agent after such a 
revision is characterized by P.A. We can show the following 
key results. First, Pl determines a valid epistemic state: 
Proposition 4 lfii(A) > 0 then Pl is a probability func­
tion. 
We also have that the revised probability function respects 
the truth conditions for our conditional connective, and 
hence corresponds precisely to the belief set I< .A: 
Theorem 5 M f:: A =>  B (i.e., BE I<.AJ iff P_4(B) = 1. 
Given the representation result Theorem 1, we can show 
that this model forms a proper extension of the AGM theory 
of revision. For any CPM M, let the * denote the revision 
function induced by theM (i.e., K.A = { B : P_4 (B) = 1} ). 
Corollary 6 The induced revision function * satisfies the 
AGM postulates,· and for any I< andAGM revision function 
*• there is a CPM that induces *· 
Finally, it's not hard to see that Pl respects the usual notion 
of conditionalization when this is applicable: 
Theorem 7 lf P(A) > 0 then P_4 (B) = f(BIA). 
Thus CPMs can be viewed in several different ways. First, 
they extend the AGM theory of revision (and hence condi­
tional theories of default reasoning) with the power to ex­
press uncertain conclusions probabilistically. Second, they 
can be thought of as a means of representing counterfactual 
probabilities and extending the notion of conditionalization 
to conditions with zero probability. Third, they unify pos­
sibility and probability theory in a way that highlights the 
orthogonal roles they have to play in the representation of 
uncertain information and inference. 
Notice that while we have specified here an updated factual 
probability function, we have said nothing about the new 
466 Boutilier 
counterjactual probabilities an agent should adopt upon 
learning A. There are several ways in which one might 
proceed. We discuss this issue in the concluding section. 
3.2 Using Factual Probabilities 
Given this semantics for counterfactual probabilities, the 
question remains: how should one compute the result of 
updating a belief set? Given that one has standard tech­
niques for dealing with probability measures, these can be 
used in (at least) two ways to simulate this model of coun­
terfactual probabilities. The first fairly obvious method is 
to assign a unique probability function Pk for each degree 
of possibility in the range of 1r (i.e., for each k = 1r( w) 
for some w ). 5 The functions Pk in this sequence need only 
satisfy the property that no two distinct functions assign 
positive probability to the same maximal conjunction of lit­
erals. In other words, if Pk ( w) > 0 then Pi ( w) = 0 for 
all j f k. Call such a sequence of functions admissible. 
The most possible junction for sentence A in this sequence, 
denoted PA, is the function Pk where 
k = max{i: Pi(A) > 0} 
When revising by A, we simply find the most possible 
function for A, and condition on A. It's not hard to see the 
following: 
Proposition 8 For any CPM there is an admissible se­
quence of probability junctions such that PA.(B) = 
PA(BIA). For each admissible sequence, there is a CPM 
such that the same relation holds. 
Clearly, this definition of admissible sequence relies cru­
cially on the fact that there are a finite number of worlds. 
However, it suggests an obvious generalization of ourCPMs 
to deal with infinite languages. We simply postulate a se­
quence of arbitrary indexed probability functions suitable 
for the language in question. The most possible function in 
the sequence represents the agent's current epistemic state. 
Revision by A is simply a matter of finding the most pos­
sible function that satisfies A, then conditioning by A with 
respect to that function. In order to mimic the structure of 
CPMs, we would have to insist that "maximal conjunctions" 
or possible worlds have positive probability for no more that 
one function. This is impossible to impose logically since 
worlds correspond to "infinite conjunctions." It toms out, 
however, that imposin1 such a constraint has no effect on 
the results of revision. In essence, allowing worlds to be 
assigned more than one possibility value (i.e., permitting 
"duplicate worlds") has no effect on revision, since only 
the most possible value will ever have an influence on our 
5U sing a sequence of probability functions is suggested infor­
mally by Lewis (1976). 
6To see this, imagine that two distinct functions Pi and Pk were 
such that each assigned positive probability to some possible world 
(infinite conjunction) w. (We assume j < k.) The probability 
assigned to w by the less possible function Pi can influence the 
result of revision by A only if: a) Pi is the most possible function 
for A; and b) w I= A, for the updated function is given by 
PA.(B) = Pj(BIA). But if w I= A then Pk(A) > 0 also, 
contradicting the fact that Pi is most possible for A. 
deliberations. Thus, specifying an arbitrary sequence of 
probability functions, ordered by degree of possibility, is 
a sound (and very general) representation mechanism for 
counterfactual probabilities. 
There is a second method one might use to reason with 
counterfactual �robabilities using standard probabilistic 
representations. We can combine the sequence of probabil­
ity functions into one function if the set of worlds assigned 
to any degree of possibility is finitely characterizable. This 
simply means that each cluster of equally possible worlds 
corresponds to some finite theory, or sentence a. In the case 
of our finite language, this must be true. 8 In such a case, we 
need only index each possibility value by its characterizing 
sentence and incorporate this sentence during conditional­
ization. Formally, we require a sentence ak. fork > 0, 
such that 
llakll = {w: 1r(w) = k} 
An arbitrary sequence of sentences is admissible iff the 
elements of the sequence are pairwise disjoint: a i 1- ..,ak 
iff j f k. We can assign an arbitrary positive probability 
weight to each possible world, defining a single probability 
function P. To revise by A, we need to find the most 
possible characterizing sentence consistent with A: the ak 
such that 
k = max{i: ai If ...,A} 
We denote this sentence a A. To revise by A, we must 
condition on A; but we are only interested in the most 
possible A-worlds, those that satisfy aA. It's not hard to 
see the following: 
Proposition 9 For any CPM there is an admissible se­
quence of sentences and a probability junction P such that 
PA.(B) = P(BIA A aA)· For each admissible sequence 
and probability function P, there is a CPM such that the 
same relation holds. 
Notice that the single probability function P used to simu­
late the counterfactual probability function cannot be given 
a reasonable intuitive interpretation. Indeed, P assigns less 
than certain probability to full beliefs; and it may make im­
possible sentences more probable than full beliefs! Func­
tion P should be understood as simply a technical device to 
allow "non-counterfactual" probabilistic reasoning meth­
ods to be applied. Thus, one need not define new reasoning 
mechanisms to deal with counterfactual probabilities. 
4 Generalized Imaging9 
Lewis ( 1976) proposed a method for probabilistic updat­
ing known as imaging that generally gives results different 
7Thank:s to Fahiem Bacchus for suggesting this representation. 
8For arbitrary languages and finite conditional KBs, this will 
be the case should one choose, say, a unique most compact model 
of KB. For example, Pearl's (1990) SystemZ has this property, as 
does the most compact possibility ranking of (Benferhat, Dubois 
and Prade 1992). Furthermore, there will be only a finite number 
of possibility values assigned to possible worlds. 
9In this section, we present a technical result that is somewhat 
orthogonal to the rest of the paper. 
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from those for conditionalization. In a possible worlds 
framework, the distinction can be understood as follows. 
We assume a probability function P is determined by an as­
signment of weight to a finite set of possible worlds. When 
an epistemic state is updated by sentence A through condi­
tionalization, the weight assigned to ...,A -worlds is retracted 
and the remaining weight (assigned to A -worlds) is normal­
ized. This can be thought of as taking the totality of weight 
P( -,A) and redistributing it among the A-worlds: each A­
world gets a share of this total in accordance with its relative 
weight among all A-worlds. Notice that conditionalization 
by A is undefined if P(A) = 0, for the relative weight of 
individual A -worlds has no meaning in this context. 
Lewis's imaging can be thought of as a different way of ef­
fecting the minimal change of P. Each world w is assumed 
to have a unique most similar A-world, denoted f( w, A), 
that is most like w in relevant respects and satisfies A. 
The function f is a selection function that picks out this 
most similar A-world. As with conditionalization, when 
an update A is to be achieved, weight must be appropri­
ated from -,A-worlds and assigned to A-worlds. However, 
Lewis claims that it is reasonable to expect that the weight 
taken away from a -,A-world not be arbitrarily distributed 
among all A-worlds. Rather one should assign the weight 
taken from w to its most similar counterpart satisfying A, 
namely f(w, A). It is clear that typically such a method 
of update will yield results different from conditionaliza­
tion. It is also clear that imaging by A is meaningful even 
when P(A) = 0. Notice that one need not distinguish 
A-worlds from -,A-worlds in the redistribution of weight. 
If we insist that the selection function be centered, that is 
if f(w, A) = w whenever w f:: A, then we simply redis­
tribute the weight from every world w to f(w, A). Iff is 
centered, A-worlds (in effect) keep their own weight. 
Gardenfors (1988) describes a slightly more general form 
of imaging known as generalized imaging. This form of up­
date proceeds as with imaging, except that the most similar 
A-world for w need not be unique. Instead, we let/( w, A) 
denote a set of A -worlds, those that are most similar to 
w. When imaging by A, the weight taken from some -,A­
world is redistributed in the appropriate proportions among 
the worlds in f( w, A). This clearly adheres to the spirit and 
intent of Lewis's notion. Formally, we have: 
Definition 8 Let V be a (finite) set of worlds and P map 
V into [0, 1]. We let P also denote the probability 
function (on sentences) induced by this mapping of W. 
A selection function is a mapping f from W x LCPL 
into 2 w .10 An revision function * is a generalized 
imaging function iff there exists a selection function f 
such thatP,:(w) = 
""' P(w) . 
L.J 
{P(v). l:{P(u): u E f(v, A)} . 
wE f(v,A)} 
vEW 
Our method of update using counterfactual probabilities 
can be viewed as a generalized imaging function simply 
10Typically we impose restrictions on f (e.g., so that se­
mantically equivalent formulae determine the same most similar 
worlds), but these are of no concern here. 
by taking the set Pl(A) to denote the set f( w, A) for each 
world w. If we wish, we can also use a centered selection 
function defined as f(w,A) = {w} for all A-worlds and 
f(w,A) = Pl(A) for-,A-worlds. With this we see: 
Theorem 10 Let M be a CPM that induces factual prob­
ability junction P and revision operator * (that is, the re­
vision of P by A is given by P_.:). Then* is a generalized 
imaging function. 
Together with Theorem 7 this shows that a generalized 
imaging function can be constructed in such a way that 
it accommodates conditionalization. This stands in sharp 
contrast with the claim of Gllrdenfors (1988, Ch.5) that con­
ditionalization and generalized imaging are fundamentally 
incompatible. Our method of revision using counterfac­
tual probabilities, in fact, embraces both approaches. We 
explore the full implications of this unification in a longer 
version of this paper. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
We have presented a semantics for default reasoning and 
belief revision that admits degrees of belief. Our system 
incorporates the key aspects of both qualitative and quan­
titative methods, capturing the statics of representation and 
the dynamics of revision. It extends both AGM revision 
and conditionalization, and can be viewed as a form of gen­
eralized imaging. It can also be seen as a unification of 
probability and possibility theory. 
One issue that remains unaddressed in this paper is the 
derivation of new counterfactual probabilities after update, 
and how to iterate the process of revision. The updated 
function p_.: is specified only for factual probabilities, and 
determines the new objective epistemic state. Counterfac­
tual conditional probabilities P.A ( C j B) remain unspec" 
ified when p_.: (B) = 0. So imagine one updates P by 
A. If P,:(B) = 0, then the result of updating p_.: by B 
is cannot be determined. There are several directions in 
which one might proceed. One method extends the quali­
tative natural revision model of (Boutilier 1993c). In this 
approach, the worlds in Pl( A) become most possible while 
all other worlds retain the same (relative) ranking of pos­
sibility. If the relative probability weight of each world 
remains unchanged, this model provides a method of up­
dating counterfactual probabilities in which as few counter­
factual probability values as possible are altered. A some­
what different mechanism would adopt the method of ]­
conditioning proposed by Goldszmidt and Pearl (1992) for 
updating conditional rankings. However, such a method 
involves the updating the possibility distribution so that 
worlds that originally had different degrees of possibility 
now can have the same degree. How to reconcile the rela­
tive weights of such worlds in this case is not clear. Related 
to these proposals is the model of arbitrary conditional re­
vision proposed in (Boutilier and Goldszmidt 1993). Such 
a model, if extended, would allow one to update counter­
factual probabilities without changing factual probabilities. 
Another issue that remains unaddressed is how factual prob-
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abilities can influence or determine counterfactual probabil­
ities. This is a difficult problem, even in qualitative belief 
revision. The impact of the AGM theory (and our model 
here) is to suggest that, in general, one must permit arbi­
trary changes. Practically speaking, this is unsatisfying, 
and practical constraints on updating probabilities must be 
investigated. For example, if A is "unrelated" to B and 
C, and P is updated by A, we would like the conditional 
probability P( CIB) to influence (perhaps determine) the 
new probability P_A(C!B), even if P(A) = 0. 
We are currently exploring the use of counterfactual proba­
bilities in model-based diagnosis. In (Boutilier and Becher 
1993), we have embedded logical approaches to diagno­
sis in the qualitative conditional framework. Conditional 
defaults allow one to completely (but defeasibly) discount 
potential candidate diagnoses. Attaching (counterfactual) 
probabilities to such rules allows one to represent the fact 
that certain of the remaining candidates are more likely 
than others. This provides a semantics that might underly 
methods of logical diagnosis that incorporate probabilistic 
information (de Kleer 1991 ;  Poole 1993). 
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